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It is Chantal Mouffe’s contention that the central weakness of consensus-driven forms of 
liberalism, such as John Rawls’ political liberalism and Jürgen Habermas’ deliberative 
democracy, is that they refuse to acknowledge conflict and pluralism, especially at the level 
of the ontological. Their defence for doing so is that conflict and pluralism are the result of 
attempts to incorporate unreasonable and irrational claims into the public political sphere. In 
this context, unreasonable and irrational claims are those that cannot be translated into 
universalizable terms. However, for Mouffe, it is this intentional exclusionary act itself that is 
detrimental to a well-functioning democratic polity. It is only through the inclusion of a 
diverse body of subject positions that a democratic polity can be said to be truly 
representative of the polity, and therefore constitute a functioning and inclusive democracy.   
This paper will examine Mouffe’s account of agonistic pluralism. In doing so, it will 
demonstrate that instead of being a source of instability within the democratic discourse and 
therefore relegated into the private non-political sphere, passions and values that are 
constitutive of these subject positions ought to be incorporated into the public political 
sphere. Mouffe’s rationale for doing so is that it is precisely through their incorporation that 
citizens will retain their allegiance to the democratic polity. However, as part of this 
examination, this paper will also draw attention to an under-developed aspect of Mouffe’s 
account of agonistic democracy, specifically problems regarding both participation and 
exclusion. Whilst Mouffe does provide a robust counterpoint to both Rawls’ political 
liberalism and Habermas’ deliberative democracy, it is my contention that she fails to explain 
adequately what it is that persuades participants to act democratically and adhere to the 
requirements of agonal respect, nor what should happen when the ethico-political principles 
of liberty and equality are not accepted.  
  
  
Pluralism within Agonistic Politics  
  
Conflicts (or antagonisms, which is the term that Mouffe favours) occur at the point of 
contact between the boundaries of discourse, and emerge through acts of closure or when 
constituting any totality. In this context, concepts such as ‘meaning’, ‘discourse’,  
‘objectivity’ and ‘society’, are representative of such totalities.i As these limits are an integral 
part of politics, politics is therefore constituted by conflict and contestation. This is in direct 
contrast to the thought of liberal theorists such as Rawls and Habermas, who suggest that 
consensus is always possible in the public political sphere. According to them, if an impasse 
occurs, it is not because the model itself is broken, but rather because those involved are not 
couching their discourse in reasonable and universalizable terms. However, for Mouffe, 
antagonisms are an inescapable part of the political process and discourse, as the creation of 
an identity, either individual or collective, is always an act of power. This power-laden 
formative process always requires an I/you or us/them distinction, and is therefore constantly 
creating an adversarial relationship to ‘the other’.ii  
Pluralism, as Mouffe understands it, refers to the fact that society is not a closed sphere – it is 
both open and porous. Accordingly, this gives rise to the creation of multiple social identities. 
As Laclau demonstrates, these identities are never permanent or essential, but rather, are 
contingent and changing.iii It is at this point that we can begin to sketch how Mouffe’s 
understanding of pluralism is very different from that of Rawls. Rawls views ‘the fact of 
pluralism’ as one of the defining features of the modern liberal democratic polity. By this, 
Rawls refers to the fact that there exists a ‘diversity of reasonable comprehensive, religious, 
philosophical, and moral doctrines’, and that this ‘is a permanent feature of the public culture 
of democracy’.iv Rawls makes no comment as to the desirability of reasonable pluralism; he 
merely confirms its existence. As such, pluralism is simply a consequence of the free exercise 
of reason. But for Mouffe, pluralism is not just a mere ‘fact’ or ‘ramification’; it is 
fundamental to the ordering of social relations. An agonistic understanding of the social, and 
therefore of politics, views pluralism as a value in itself. For Mouffe, pluralism is the 
‘defining feature of modern democracy’:  
Envisaged from an anti-essentialist theoretical perspective, on the contrary, pluralism 
is not merely a fact, something that we must bear grudgingly or try to reduce, but an 
axiological principle. It is taken to be constitutive at the conceptual level of the very 
nature of modern democracy and considered as something that we should embrace 
and enhance. This is why the type of pluralism that I am advocating gives a positive 
status to differences and questions the objective of unanimity and homogeneity, 
which is always revealed as fictitious and based on acts of exclusion.v  
The challenge for contemporary democratic politics, therefore, is to conceptualize a 
democratic regime that allows for this expression of social plurality and difference, and this is 
a challenge that, Mouffe posits, can be met by her account of radical and plural democracy. 
As Mouffe argues, ‘Radical democracy demands that we acknowledge difference − the 
radical, the multiple, the heterogeneous − in effect, everything that has been excluded by the 
concept of Man in the abstract.’vi In effect, what Mouffe is advocating here is a form of 
radical democratic discourse which consciously incorporates many of those voices that 
Kantian liberalism and liberal rationalism exclude.  
  
  
The Agonistic Distinction between ‘the Political’ and ‘Politics’  
  
It is this ontological and therefore inescapable understanding of pluralism and antagonism 
that leads Mouffe to make an important separation and clarification between what she refers 
to as ‘the political’ and ‘politics’. There exists considerable disagreement amongst political 
philosophers about what constitutes ‘the political’. In the analysis of Andrew Schaap, these 
views can be understood as a choice between Hannah Arendt and Carl Schmitt.vii For Arendt, 
‘the political’ is a space of freedom and deliberation; it refers ‘to the potential experience of 
solidarity in moments of collective action’.viii In this category, Schaap would include thinkers 
such as Michael Walzer, James Tully and Claude Lefort. For Schmitt, ‘the political’ is a 
space of power, conflict and antagonism, where the potential exists for the ‘emergence of the 
friend-enemy relation’.ix Here Schaap includes Jacques Derrida and Giorgio Agamben. 
However, following Fossen, I would also include Nietzsche in this list.x Mouffe’s 
understanding of the political is clearly located in this second perspective. As she writes:   
More precisely this is how I distinguish between ‘the political’ and ‘politics’: ‘the 
political’ refers to the dimensions of antagonism which can take many forms and can 
emerge in diverse social relations, a dimension that can never be eradicated; ‘politics’ 
[however] refers to the ensemble of practices, discourses and institutions which seek 
to establish a certain order and to organize human coexistence in conditions which are 
always potentially conflicting because they are affected by the dimensions of ‘the 
political’.xi  
The denial of ‘the political’ in its antagonistic dimension is, in Mouffe’s analysis, liberalism’s 
‘central deficiency’.xii With the notable exceptions of Isaiah Berlin, Joseph Raz, John Gray 
and Michael Walzer, it is Mouffe’s contention that liberal political philosophers have 
continually failed to understand the ontologically plural nature of the social world. 
Furthermore, they do not acknowledge that this pluralism entails antagonism and conflict, 
and that there is no rational solution for this ontological problem (as they would envisage it). 
It is due to this continued belief in the harmony and neat dovetailing of values, as seen in 
both Rawls and Habermas, that liberalism must negate ‘the political’ as Mouffe understands 
it. Stated more directly, liberalism must shun antagonism and conflict.  
The result of liberalism’s denial of the antagonistic dimension of ‘the political’ is that, when 
confronted with such conflict, it is unable to take effective action. Instead of acknowledging 
and embracing antagonism as an ontological reality, liberalism, especially Kantian liberalism, 
attempts to deny it. As Mouffe posits:  
Such negation only leads to impotence, an impotence which characterizes liberal 
thought when confronted with the emergence of antagonisms and forms of violence 
that, according to its theory, belong to a bygone [pre-Enlightenment] age when reason 
had not yet managed to control the supposedly archaic passions.xiii   
It is Mouffe’s contention that the main weakness of what she refers to as ‘liberal rationalism’ 
is that it is reliant upon an understanding of the social that is, in turn, premised upon an 
essentialist conception of identities as not being relational or constructed, but rather as being 
inherent to themselves.xiv It is due to this flawed understanding that liberal rationalism   
[c]annot apprehend the process of construction of political identities. It cannot 
recognize that there can only be an identity when it is constructed as difference and 
that any social objectivity is constructed through acts of power. What it refuses to 
admit is that any form of social objectivity is ultimately political and that it must bear 
the traces of the acts of exclusion which governs its construction.xv  
It is at this point that Mouffe calls upon the work of Schmitt to further solidify this line of 
critique against liberalism, and liberal rationalism in particular. In The Concept of the 
Political, Schmitt argues that such an antagonistic understanding of the political could not 
possibly emerge out of the pure principle of liberalism.xvi As liberalism is characterized by 
methodological individualism, it is incapable of understanding the collective, or, indeed, even 
the contingent, nature of identities. For liberalism, and especially for Kantian liberalism, 
identities are always singular and essential, fixed and non-contingent. For Schmitt, however, 
what makes the political unique is that it necessitates the friend/enemy distinction and 
discrimination. For Schmitt, ‘the enemy’ is defined as:   
the other, the stranger; and it is sufficient for his nature that he is, in a specifically 
intense way, existentially something different and alien, so that in the extreme case, 
conflicts with him are possible. These [conflicts] can neither be decided by a 
previously general norm nor by the judgement of a disinterested and therefore neutral 
third party.xvii  
For Schmitt, the political is concerned with the formation of a ‘we’ and not of the ‘they’, and 
is therefore focused on the construction of collective identities. However, as these collective 
identities are formed through conflict and antagonism, they are the result not of free 
discussion, but of decision and exclusion.xviii In this context, as Smith notes, ‘A group of 
people only become a unified and coherent subject to the extent that they share a common 
enemy.’xix Schmitt’s understanding of the political, therefore, highlights the inescapability of 
conflict and antagonisms. In Schmitt’s analysis, liberalism negates the political in its 
antagonistic aspect as it tends to represent pluralist conflicts in terms of intellectual 
differences of opinion or economic competitors. As Schmitt notes:   
In a very systematic fashion liberal thought evades or ignores state and politics and 
moves instead in a typical recurring polarity of two heterogeneous spheres, namely 
ethics and economics, intellect and trade, education and property. The critical distrust 
of state and politics is easily explained by the principle of a system whereby the 
individual must remain terminus a quo [the starting point] and terminus ad quem [the 
end point].xx  
Schmitt does not deny that within the context of the friend/enemy dichotomy consensus can 
emerge. This consensus can only be achieved, however, through the exercise of power and 
exclusion, as opposed to the power-free rational discourse that is espoused by theorists such 
as Rawls or Habermas.xxi This interpretation of the political and exclusionary nature of how 
consensus is achieved is important as it undermines much of the recent work of Rawls and 
Habermas. As Mouffe writes:   
Consensus in a liberal-democratic society is − and always will be − the expression of 
a hegemony and the crystallization of power relations. The frontier that it establishes 
between what is and what is not legitimate is a political one, and for that reason it 
should remain contestable. To deny the existence of such a moment of closure, or to 
present the frontier as dictated by rationality or morality, is to naturalize what should 
be perceived as a contingent and temporary hegemonic articulation of ‘the people’ 
through a particular regime of inclusion−exclusion.xxii  
This point has important political implications that I shall examine in more detail later in this 
paper. Briefly, both Laclau and Mouffe argue that the liberal democratic discourse reduces all 
political debate to issues about proceduralism and administration.xxiii This is done through the 
construction of a political consensus that actively excludes Schmitt’s conception of the 
‘enemy’. However, radical democracy consists of acknowledging the exclusionary nature of 
the political, and therefore attempts to incorporate into the political fold as many voices as 
possible. As Smith notes, ‘For radical democratic pluralism…the political consists in the 
struggles to hegemonize the social; that is, in the struggles to reconstruct the social and its 
subjects through the institutionalization of democratic and egalitarian worldviews.’xxiv 
Radical democracy, therefore, is concerned with both acknowledging the friend/enemy and 
we/they distinction, and trying to expand the contingent frontiers of this separation in order to 
incorporate part of the enemy into the friend.  
  
  
Emancipatory Agonism  
  
What then, are the normative implications of the points raised thus far for the agonistic 
critique of liberal democracy? In order to accurately address this question, it is important that 
we make a distinction between two fundamentally different forms of agonism, that is between 
perfectionist and emancipatory agonism. In order to develop this separation, I will draw upon 
the recent scholarship of Fossen.xxv The distinction has received scant attention within the 
academic literature. Indeed, the diversity of thought within the emancipatory agonistic project 
itself has attracted substantially more attention, and thus produced more literature, than this 
larger dichotomy within the agonistic project broadly conceived.  
Whilst there exists a degree of common ground between these two interpretations of agonism, 
especially at the level of analysis, they differ dramatically in their utilization of the agonistic 
critique. Perfectionist agonism is aimed at the cultivation of nobility, whereas emancipatory 
agonism is used to challenge consensus and social/political exclusion. Of the two 
interpretations, emancipatory agonism is best suited to meet the demands of Mouffe’s 
agonistic project, and will therefore be the focus of discussion.xxvi As its name suggests, 
emancipatory agonism is driven by the concept of emancipation. However, this is a very 
different understanding of emancipation from that of traditional accounts of liberalism. 
Whilst liberalism is often associated with the establishment and preservation of (negative) 
liberty among individuals, emancipatory agonism is concerned with exposing and remedying 
the harms and injustices that are caused by violence and exclusion, which are themselves the 
result of liberalism’s attempts to deny or restrict pluralism. As opposed to the liberal 
discourses of Rawls or Habermas, emancipatory agonism is not concerned with transcending 
relations of power, or attempting to bring individuals and groups together at some 
uncontested point of measure. ‘Rather’, as Fossen argues:   
The term emancipation is meant as an umbrella that captures attempts to redress 
instances of what agonists variously identify as inequality, injustice, exclusion, 
marginalization, subordination, and violence, while acknowledging that these harms 
are to some extent inherent in politics. The emancipatory value of contestation lies in 
its capacity to allow individuals to challenge these harms and thereby possibly 
diminish them. In other words, agonists seek to empower citizens to challenge the 
harm endemic to their politics.xxvii  
In order to meet the aims of emancipatory agonism, what is needed is a democratic model 
that is capable of achieving what the liberal rationalist’s democratic model cannot − it must 
be able to grasp the true and unavoidable nature of Mouffe’s conception of ‘the political’. 
Accordingly, Mouffe wishes to propose a democratic model that places the questions of 
power, antagonism and exclusion ‘at its very centre’.xxviii Laclau and Mouffe have already 
examined the theoretical foundations of this approach in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy.xxix 
Here they concluded that the goals of socialism can only be achieved through democratic 
means because the strict and rigid class-based economic analysis of Marx was no longer 
tenable.xxx The crux of this text (as it relates to the focus of this paper) is that it is only 
through acts of power that social objectivity is constituted. The implications of their thesis are 
quite profound: it follows that social objectivity is therefore political, and will always possess 
traces of that which it excludes as part of its constitution.xxxi Objectivity is never pure as it 
always contains trace elements of the excluded ‘other’.  
In this context, for Laclau and Mouffe, hegemony refers to the meeting point where 
objectivity and power converge (or alternatively, at the point of mutual collapse). This 
suggests a very different way of understanding power. Under the liberal rationalist and 
democratic consensus view, power was always viewed as existing externally to the 
relationship that took place between two pre-constituted identities. But under this new 
understanding, power is viewed as constituting the identities themselves.xxxii  
This in turn gives rise to a new way of viewing political orders and practices. They can no 
longer be viewed simply as representing the interests and desires of pre-constituted identities. 
Instead, because any political order is essentially the expression of a hegemonic articulation 
(the point where objectivity and power converge/collapse), political orders and practices are 
nothing more than a particular and contingent ordering of power relations.xxxiii Put another 
way, if all political orders are the expression of a particular hegemonic articulation, this 
would suggest that all political orders are simply contingent expressions of the meeting point 
between objectivity and power.  
This reworking of the nature of political orders and practices results in a transformation of the 
relationship between democracy and power. Under a traditional liberal democratic 
understanding of this relationship, power plays a decreasing role in constituting social 
identities as the level of democracy spreads. This is an inverse relationship: as democracy 
increases, power should decrease. The ultimate aim of this traditional relationship is the 
domination of democracy over power.xxxiv But as Mouffe has argued, following the analysis 
that she and Laclau set out in Hegemony and the Socialist Strategy, power relations are 
constitutive of the social. Therefore, the central focus of democracy and the democratic 
discourse ought to shift in order to reflect this change adequately. We need to reconceptualise 
what democratic politics ought to be about. Instead of being concerned with the elimination 
of power relations, democratic politics ought to be concerned with ‘how to constitute forms 
of power [that are] more compatible with democratic values’.xxxv This, then, becomes the 
central aim of both radical and plural democracy:  
To acknowledge the existence of relations of power and the need to transform them, 
while renouncing the illusion that we could free ourselves completely from power, 
this is what is specific to the project of ‘radical and plural democracy’ that we are 
advocating.xxxvi  
Perhaps the most profound implication of this radical reconceptualization of the democratic 
project is that it rules out the idea of a normative democratic consensus and harmonization of 
values, a concept that is fundamental to both the Rawlsian and Habermasian political project. 
Given this new understanding of the relationship between power and identity, it is no longer 
possible for a delineated social actor to claim they represent the totality, and thus have control 
over its theoretical foundations.xxxvii  
This then provides Mouffe with the theoretical terrain that she needs to formulate her 
conception of agonistic pluralism. For Mouffe, agonistic pluralism is more closely aligned 
with Richard Rorty’s idea of ‘redescribing’ the basic premise of liberal democracy 
‘metaphorically’. Thus, not only is there an acknowledgement of liberal democracy’s 
conflictual and agonistic character, but there is an accompanying acknowledgement of its 
importance. It is only once this understanding of the nature of ‘the political’ is embraced that 
one can begin to move towards the challenge that liberal democracy faces, which is the 
attempt to mitigate the antagonisms that exist within ‘politics’.xxxviii As Mouffe writes:   
Indeed, the fundamental question is not how to arrive at a consensus reached without 
exclusion, because this would require the construction of an ‘us’ that would not have 
a corresponding ‘them’. Yet this is impossible because…the very condition for the 
constitution of an ‘us’ is the demarcation of a ‘them’. The crucial issue then is how to 
establish this us/them distinction which is constitutive of politics in a way that is 
compatible with the recognition of pluralism.xxxix  
Thus, the political issue becomes one of establishing an us/them distinction in such a way that 
it remains compatible with pluralist democracy. In order to achieve this desired outcome, we 
must reformulate our understanding of ‘them’. Instead of interpreting ‘them’ as an enemy that 
needs to be eradicated, we ought to view ‘them’ as an adversary, as someone whose ideas we 
will fight against, but whose right to defend those ideas are never questioned.  
  
The Inclusive Nature of Agonistic Pluralism  
  
Although this may appear at first glance to be just an issue of semantics, this is not the case, 
as the distinction between an adversary and an enemy is an important one. Whilst this shift 
does not remove the points of conflict that may arise with the us/them distinction, it does 
relocate the conflict onto common ground. Thus, whilst an adversary is still an enemy, they 
are now perceived as a legitimate enemy; that is to say they are an enemy that, despite what 
other differences may exist, shares the belief in the legitimacy of what Mouffe refers to as 
‘the ethico-political principles of liberal democracy: liberty and equality’.xl Whilst those 
within this us/them distinction may disagree on the exact meaning, parameters or 
implementation of these two ethico-political principles, they continue to accept their 
importance. Contrary to the thought of liberal rationalists such as Rawls and Habermas, this 
is not a disagreement that can be mediated through rational or neutral discussion or 
deliberation. It is owing to this impossibility that politics retains its antagonistic character. 
Whilst the adversaries within the us/them distinction may cease to disagree, or come to a 
temporary compromise, a specifically rational consensus is impossible.xli  
To draw an analogy that dovetails neatly with Wittgenstein’s understanding and use of 
games, whilst two chess players may possess radically different philosophies on how to play 
chess (traditional, modern or hyper-modern openings, for instance), they agree on the existing 
pre-set rules of the game. Despite their differing philosophies, they both accept how certain 
pieces can and cannot be moved, and how the game itself is won or lost. Certain openings or 
styles of play may be accepted as being better than others only under specific conditions. As 
such, therefore, both players accept the pre-set rules of the game. Indeed, participation itself 
is predicated upon acceptance of these rules.   
This shift from enemy to adversary also requires a corresponding shift from antagonism to 
agonism. Political relations should no longer be understood as antagonism between enemies, 
but rather as agonism between adversaries.xlii Whereas antagonism refers to the struggle 
between enemies who wish to eradicate each other, agonism refers to a struggle between 
adversaries who accept the pre-set rules of the game. Therefore, the aim of emancipatory 
agonistic politics, and of democratic pluralism itself, is to transform antagonistic relationships 
into agonistic relationships.  
It is at this point, however, that Mouffe could be open to a charge of hypocrisy or 
contradiction. How is it that Mouffe believes that a rational consensus is impossible, yet 
argues that the same parties are able to pledge allegiance to the ethico-political principles of 
liberal democracy, namely liberty and equality? In other words, why are the participants in 
any dialogue unable to reach a rational consensus, yet appear to be able to agree on the preset 
rules of the game itself? More specifically, how is this agreement on the ethico-political 
principles of liberal democracy different from the forms of consensus that drive the work of 
Rawls and Habermas? In order to address this concern, Mouffe differentiates between two 
forms of consensus, the (impossible) rational consensus that is required by liberal rationalists, 
and a much thinner ‘conflictual consensus’ that is required for the success of democratic 
pluralism.   
As its name suggests, this thin conflictual consensus operates at a much lower level of 
agreement than its more substantial relative. A conflictual consensus refers only to an 
agreement on the pre-set rules of the game; that is, an allegiance to both liberty and 
equality.xliii It does not refer to its specific form nor how it is to be implemented.  
Accordingly, this thin conflictual consensus can be expressed in many different ways, such as 
liberal-conservative, social-democratic, neo-liberal or radical-democratic forms of political 
association. Whilst they all share an allegiance to the ethico-political principles of liberty and 
equality, what differentiates them is their unique interpretation of the common good, and thus 
their attempts to implement a very specific version of hegemony. These different expressions 
of the ethico-political principles provide citizens with the platforms from which their 
democratic objectives can be built, and from which an enemy can be transformed into an 
adversary. It is only from these different interpretations that antagonism can be transformed 
into agonism.xliv  
It is at this stage that we can see the emergence of another important point of differentiation 
between liberal rationalism and Mouffe’s agonistic pluralism. For Mouffe, one of the 
strengths of an agonistic approach to politics is that it does not require that passions or beliefs 
that are deemed to be unreasonable or irrational be removed from the political process in 
order to achieve the elusive rational consensus. Models that rely upon a form of rational 
consensus, such as those espoused by Rawls and Habermas, intentionally try to remove these 
passions and beliefs from the political process. As Walsh notes, traditional forms of 
deliberation tend to marginalize personal experiences and emotional expressions from the 
political process.xlv   
The reason for this relegation is due to the apparently mutually exclusive nature of legitimate 
universalizable concerns and what are considered to be the expressions of nonuniversalizable 
particularist or contingent passions. The most cogent expression of this can be located in 
Rawls’ concept of ‘the priority of the right over the good’, with its strong Kantian 
underpinnings. If these contingent and particularist elements are introduced and incorporated 
into the public political sphere and the political process, it is feared that they may undermine 
or jeopardize stability and advances towards the creation of a rational consensus. Such 
passions and values can find expression in forms such as religion, gender, sexuality and 
ethnicity.   
But for Mouffe, it is a mistake to attempt to relegate or minimize the relevance and 
importance of such non-universalizable passions and beliefs. Contrary to what Rawls or 
Habermas may argue, a consensus built around the ethico-political principles of liberal 
democracy − even if it is only a temporary consensus − is more likely to be achieved ‘by 
multiplying the institutions, the discourse, [and] the forms of life that foster identification 
with [such] democratic values’.xlvi Thus, passions and beliefs are central to an agonistic 
understanding of politics. Accordingly, ‘the prime task of democratic politics’, Mouffe 
asserts, ‘is not to eliminate passions or to relegate them to the private sphere in order to 
establish a rational consensus in the public sphere. It is, rather, to attempt to mobilize those 
passions towards democratic designs.’xlvii   
In Mouffe’s analysis, this conscious relegation of the importance of passions and beliefs, an 
act of which both Kantian liberalism and liberal rationalism are guilty, has two important and 
opposing political and social implications. First, it tends to produce ‘extreme forms of 
individualism’ that have become so widespread they ‘threaten the very social fabric’.xlviii 
Recent examples of this extreme individualism can be found at both ends of the 
socioeconomic spectrum. The actions of some of those associated with the finance sector, 
which led to the recent global financial crisis – individuals who were once referred to as the 
‘masters of the universe’, as well as of those involved in the ‘bonus culture’ within the city – 
are as much an expression of extreme individualism as the actions of some of the looters in 
the London riots of 2011.  
Second, individuals and groups tend to search for forms of collective identification that exist 
outside the traditional forms of political association and participation. The reason for this is 
that the non-universalizable contingent or particularist characteristics that are often 
understood by some people to be constitutive of their very identity are not allowed to be 
associated with conceptions of citizenship. Whilst this search for collective identification is 
not a negative desire or outcome in and of itself, it often results in forms of collective 
identification ‘that put into jeopardy the civic bond that should unite a democratic political 
association’.xlix This is often reflected in the growth of various political, religious, moral and 
ethnic fundamentalisms. As Mouffe writes:  
Democracy is in peril not only when there is insufficient consensus and allegiance to 
the values it embodies, but also when its agonistic dynamic is hindered by an apparent 
excess of consensus, which usually masks a disquieting apathy. It is also endangered 
by the growing marginalization of entire groups whose status as an ‘underclass’ 
practically puts them outside the political community.l  
In order to curtail these negative consequences that are the direct result of the unrealistic 
demand for a rational consensus and the exclusion of passions, what is required is a form of 
political association that draws people in and encourages participation, instead of pushing 
them away, hence the fundamental importance of incorporating passions and beliefs into the 
political fold. As already noted, this is more likely in a political system that acknowledges 
conflict and identity, such as agonistic pluralism. As Mouffe notes:   
Mobilization requires politicization, but politicization cannot exist without the 
production of a conflictual representation of the world, with opposed camps with 
which people can identify, thereby allowing for passions to be mobilized politically 
within the spectrum of the democratic process.li   
Thus, whilst the rationale behind the Rawlsian or Habermasian approach to removing 
passions and beliefs from the political discourse is that they are not considered to be 
conducive to achieving a consensus, Mouffe demands their inclusion precisely because they 
are more conducive (to the creation of such a consensus). A consensus is more likely to be 
achieved, therefore, through the mobilization of passions and the creation of both subject 
positions and power relations that are compatible with liberal democracy. As Gürsözlü 
concludes:  
So, as opposed to the rationalistic discussion-based procedures of the deliberative 
account, Mouffe’s (agonistic) understanding of politics proposes different techniques 
to foster democratic institutions and achieve such consensus by mobilizing passions 
around democratic values, creating forms of power that are more compatible with 
democratic principles, and multiplying the ensemble of practices that makes possible 
democratic individuals.lii  
This, therefore, suggests a fundamental reformulation of our understanding of both consensus 
and conflict. The liberal rationalism of Rawls and Habermas is designed in such a way as to 
achieve a stable consensus through the intentional exclusion of passions and beliefs, and 
through the intentional exclusion of all that is deemed to be particularist and contingent. 
However, whilst Rawls and Habermas may desire a stable and rational consensus, what is 
actually achieved is a narrow, unstable and ultimately exclusionary consensus. As Schaap 
writes, when comparing the consensus of Mouffe to that of the deliberative democrats, ‘The 
requirements that particular claims could be represented in terms of the general principles of 
public reason may therefore have the effect of silencing certain claims because they appear 
unreasonable or are simply inexpressible in these terms.’liii In contrast, the thinner conflictual 
consensus of Mouffe is a distinctly positive and inclusive conception of consensus. Even 
though this consensus is anchored firmly to the ethico-political principles of liberal 
democracy, because it does not ascribe any substantive content to these principles, and allows 
for the incorporation of the particularist and contingent into the political fold, it has the 
potential to be more inclusive than that of the liberal rationalists. Thus, even though both 
Mouffe and the liberal rationalist, such as Rawls and Habermas, want to achieve a similar 
goal (a stable, inclusive and functioning democratic polity), they go about it in radically 
different and opposing ways.  
Given the diverse demographics of those who participate in the formulation of this conflictual 
consensus, it is inevitable that disagreement and conflicts will arise. However, contrary to 
what the liberal rationalists and adherents of Kantian liberalism hold, this conflict or 
confrontation should not be understood as a sign of imperfection. Rather, as Mouffe draws to 
our attention in the introduction to The Return of The Political, ‘A healthy democratic 
process calls for a vibrant clash of political positions and an open conflict of interests. If such 
[a clash] is missing, it can too easily be replaced by a confrontation between non-negotiable 
moral values and essentialist identities.’liv  
  
  
Agonistic Democracy: Participation and Exclusion  
Those who are grappling with Mouffe’s radical democratic project should not, however, 
misinterpret or misconstrue what she is trying to achieve, nor its implications. This is an 
important point, and it needs to be considered by those who are supportive of this 
reinterpretation of democracy, and equally by those who are critical of it. It would be wrong 
to conclude that it is Mouffe’s contention that her radical democratic project, underpinned by 
her account of agonistic pluralism, is the utopian panacea for all of those who are excluded by 
the rational and consensus model of liberalism. Whilst her radical democratic project is 
defended on the grounds that it is more capable of generating the assent of citizens within the 
modern liberal democratic polity than is the liberal rational or consensus model of Rawls and 
Habermas, there is no claim that it is able to gain the assent of all citizens. Exclusion is still a 
possibility in this account of democracy. Accordingly, the remainder of this paper will 
examine some important questions regarding the twin issues of participation and exclusion 
that are raised by such a radical democratic project.  
The strength of Mouffe’s democratic framework is the acceptance of a shift in the discourse 
from the ‘moral’ to ‘the political’. What were previously viewed as constituting universal and 
reasonable grounds for achieving a moral (and therefore ultimately political) consensus are 
now seen as political constructs, achieved, in part, through acts of exclusion. As Mouffe 
argues, instead ‘of trying to erase the traces of power and exclusion, democratic politics 
requires us to bring them to the fore, to make them visible so that they can enter the terrain of 
contestation.’lv Democratic deliberation will still require a clear distinction between what is 
reasonable and what is not. However, this demarcation is in perpetual contestation, and must 
be viewed as political, not moral. Whilst, as this paper has demonstrated, Mouffe’s project is 
more nuanced than this, it is the political construction of both reasonableness and consensus 
that lies at the heart of her reformulation of the agonistic democratic framework. However, 
whilst I concur with Mouffe that this shift from the moral to the political is more likely to be 
inclusive and encourage participation from previously excluded citizens (at either the 
individual or collective level), there are still a number of troubling questions that need to be 
addressed.  
First, it is not clear why the parties involved should accept the premise of an agonistic 
democratic framework. Depending on the degree of disagreement or difference between the 
parties involved (or, as Schaap has noted, the harm suffered due to past injustices in deeply 
divided societies such as South Africa, Chile and East Timorlvi), insisting that participants 
view each other with agonistic respect may be difficult to achieve. The shift from antagonism 
to agonism, from enemy to adversary, a shift that is fundamental to Mouffe’s democratic 
framework, should not be underestimated. To situate the terms of debate in such a way 
requires a substantial conceptual change from all participants. Let us refer once again to the 
example of the two chess players. We have already established that each player may possess 
different views on how best to play. But even prior to this, each participant must want to play 
the game in the first place, and in doing so, accept their opponent’s right to play, and that 
defeat is a distinct possibility.   
Accordingly, the first problem that Mouffe’s account of agonistic democracy must overcome 
is to convince the participants that not only is it in their best interest to do so, but it is also in 
the best interest of the polity as a whole. This requires not only a substantial change in how 
one views the political process itself, but also how one views the other participants. I posit 
that Mouffe does not provide us with a sufficiently robust explanation as to how this shift 
from enemy to adversary will come about. As Kapoor correctly brings to our attention:  
a lot is unexplained here: where do her imperative constructions – “all the participants 
will recognize” and “we need” - come from? On what are they based? What will 
compel these groups to act democratically? What will guarantee or impel their 
legitimacy? In the absence of answers to these questions, it is difficult to interpret 
Mouffe’s “logic of equivalence” as anything other than voluntarism. She appears 
satisfied that social movements and protest groups will by themselves discover and 
practice democratic citizenship, in spite of evidence…to the contrary.lvii  
Here, perhaps, we can see a paradox in Mouffe’s account of agonistic democracy. In societies 
that are beset by a substantial degree of difference and disagreement, Mouffe’s agonistic 
democratic framework may offer a viable political solution to exclusion, instability and 
apathy, as well as possessing a number of distinct conceptual advantages over Rawls’ 
political liberalism and Habermas’ deliberative democracy. Yet it is precisely in these 
environments that it may struggle to be adopted.   
However, let us assume that the participants have accepted the requirements for an agonistic 
account of democracy. A further problem remains regarding the lack of institutionalized 
procedures and frameworks, as this may result in the practitioners themselves having to 
develop the rules for discourse.lviii Whilst this, in and of itself, is not problematical, it may 
result in negative consequences. In such negotiations it is rare for some type of power 
imbalance not to exist between the various participants. Even if all parties accept the 
ethicopolitical principles of liberty and equality, such an uneven outcome may be an 
unintended consequence. For example, feminists have drawn our attention to the fact that 
women often work a ‘double-shift’ of both wage labour and domestic labour. This severely 
undermines their ability to participate in any form of democratic discourse and framework, 
thus often perpetuating the gendered division of labour and political exclusion.lix  
Furthermore, there is still the contested issue regarding the construction of that which is 
deemed to be reasonable. It has already been established that any consensus reached is 
political, as opposed to moral, in nature. But even when this is taken into account, such a 
political consensus may never be achieved if the parties involved are unwilling to cede 
ground on certain issues, especially if those issues are of fundamental importance to their 
sense of identity or belonging. For example, certain communities may agree to the 
ethicopolitical principles of liberty and equality, but with the proviso that certain issues are 
simply not open for discussion or compromise.  
Certain forms of pluralism can be readily translated into these ethico-political principles, and, 
accordingly, can easily be incorporated into the political fold.lx But what of those individuals 
or groups who do not accept these twin principles? As Deveaux correctly points out:  
agonistic democrats have so far little to say about citizens who may refuse to 
cooperate with other citizens, or about groups that have an entrenched interest in 
having a conflict continue unresolved. These are difficult cases, meriting special 
political measures to compel agreement, rather than more talk: consider the situation 
of a community that has decided to live separately from the rest of society, and the 
case of an ethnic group whose sole goal is that of political secession.lxi   
In a 2011 lecture at the University of Kent, Mouffe suggested that such individuals and 
groups ought to be excluded.lxii However, it is unclear exactly what she meant by this. Is it 
her position that it is the views themselves that ought to be excluded, while those who hold 
them retain the full rights and entitlements associated with citizenship? Or, more forcefully, is 
it her position that as a direct consequence of holding such views, the individuals and groups 
themselves lose their rights and entitlements? This is an important issue that, thus far, Mouffe 
has not addressed in any academic literature.  
However, it need not be that all citizens support these ethico-political principles. What is 
necessary, though, is that the vast majority do. I draw this distinction because, as Shorten 
suggests, the existence of a small number of people who, for various reasons, reject the 
ethico-political principles of liberal democracy, does not compromise the stability of the 
larger democratic community or institutions.lxiii This has been demonstrated in America with 
the various Amish, Mennonite and Hudderite communities, who have successfully isolated 
themselves from the larger social and political community. Thus, even the existence of a 
small percentage of the population who continually refuse to accept the ethico-political 
principles of liberal democracy need not undermine social stability, irrespective of whether 
these groups fall under the banner of thin or thick pluralism. Of course, the implication of this 
caveat is also true: should, for whatever reason, the numbers of these ‘non-participants’ rise 
to the point where their continued refusal to accept the legitimacy of the ethico-political 
principles of liberal democracy begins to undermine social stability, then, prima facie, the 
state may have grounds to act. To clarify, though, this action on behalf of the state should not 
be motivated by the existence of communities who refuse to participate, but rather, only if 
and when the numbers of these non-participants rises to the point where it begins to 
undermine social and political stability.  
  
  
Concluding Remarks  
Mouffe’s agonistic project, premised on her ontological account of pluralism, provides a 
strong rebuttal to the work of liberal rationalists such as Rawls and Habermas. Through its 
focus on hegemony and political contestation, agonistic democracy can open new spaces for 
participatory politics, incorporating actors that may otherwise be excluded. However, perhaps 
the real strength of Mouffe’s agonistic account of democracy lies not in the form of its 
political solution, but rather that it provides a different way of viewing and understanding 
political exclusion, conflict and difference.  
Yet despite the strength of Mouffe collective writings on radical pluralism and agonistic 
democracy, questions still remains regarding issues of both participation and exclusion. 
Instead of viewing this as a weakness, I propose that it ought rather to be viewed as an area 
for future research. Agonistic pluralism and radical democracy is an ongoing project whose 
parameters are not yet fixed. Indeed, given the nature of this project, it is doubtful whether 
these parameters can or ought to be fixed. What this open-ended democratic project does 
allow, however, is a continued defence of the value of democracy, whilst simultaneously 
attempting to broaden the scope of the actors able to participate. Participation and inclusion 
within this project ought to be seen, by those actors who may be critical of the ethico-political 
principles of liberty and equality, as being more beneficial than non-participation and, 
ultimately, exclusion.  
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